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Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton:
A Caveat to the Horse Trader
INTRODUCTION
As late as 1978, Kentucky courts have asserted that "caveat
emptor," or let the buyer beware,' is "commercial reality" in
the sale of personal property or goods. 2 In 1986, however, the
court of appeals, in Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton Kentucky, Inc.,
3
substantially eroded that doctrine. The decision warns thorough-
bred sellers and auctioneers to deal in a manner befitting one of
Kentucky's leading industries or face what one commentator has
termed "caveat vendor," or "let the seller beware."
'4
Kentucky has long held a position of integrity in the horse
industry, and the Chernick holding aims at enhancing that po-
sition.5 The Chernick court purports to advance Kentucky's rep-
utation in the equine business by two means-(1) by awarding
punitive damages to a buyer damaged by a seller's breach of
contract6 and (2) by suggesting that an auctioneer may be jointly
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 202 (5th ed. 1979).
2 Greg Coats Cars, Inc. v. Kasey, 576 S.W.2d 251, 253 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
703 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
Hollingsworth, What's Going on Here, THE BLOODHORSE 5057, 5147 (July 27,
1985). The actual term is caveat venditor, which is defined as: "A maxim, or rule,
casting the responsibility for defects or deficiencies upon the seller of goods." BLACK's
LAW DICTIONARY 281 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
"We agree with the trial court that the Commonwealth of Kentucky maintains
an international reputation for excellence in the equine industry. The conduct of one of
the Commonwealth's foremost consignors of breeding stock is not to be reviewed at a
level lower than that of strict scrutiny." 703 S.W.2d at 890. Fasig-Tipton's identity as
"one of the foremost consignors" of breeding stock extends to other jurisdictions where
thoroughbreds are an important industry. For example, Fasig-Tipton also controls sales
companies in Florida, Louisiana and California. See Hollingsworth, supra note 4, at
5146.
6 For a discussion of the customary elements and measure of damages for breach
of warranty in a horse sale, see Annot., 91 A.L.R.3D 415 (1979). See also Schleicher v.
Gentry, 554 S.W.2d 884 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (buyer's remedies, in affirming contract,
limited to difference between value of mare as represented and actual value plus stud
fees).
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liable with the seller for the breach. This Note first focuses on
these approaches, then examines the future application of Cher-
nick and how the seller and auctioneer may avoid its conse-
quences.
Although equine law combines principles from various areas
of the law, many of its applications are unique. 7 Chernick in-
volved facts clearly unique to the horse industry, and the decision
reflects that the sale involved a horse rather than some other
good. 8 For this reason, this Note focuses on the implications of
Chernick to the horse trader. 9
I. THE FACTS OF Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton
The Chernicks purchased a bay mare10 named Fiddler's Col-
leen at the Keeneland breeding stock sale in November, 1981.11
7 It is questionable whether there is actually a body of law that may be designated
as "equine law." See Miller, America Singing: The Role of Custom and Usage in the
Thoroughbred Horse Industry, 74 Ky. L.J. 781 (1985-86). If indeed there is such a body of
law, its application in Chernick and similar cases is merely a combination of the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.), contract, tort and agency law. Case law and the U.C.C.
itself clearly establish that the U.C.C.'s rules apply to transactions in thoroughbred
horses. See U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1972). See also Keck v. Wacker, 413 F. Supp. 1377, 1381
(E.D. Ky. 1976); Grandi v. LeSage, 399 P.2d 285, 290 (N.M. 1965) (Both cases apply
the U.C.C. without addressing its scope.). The U.C.C., in turn, incorporates other legal
principles: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of
law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract,
principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake ...
or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions." U.C.C. § 1-
103 (1972).
See notes 163-69 infra and accompanying text.
9 The dictionary definition of a horse trader is "one who engages in horse
trading." WvEBSTER's THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1093 (unabridged 1966). Since
Chernick involved fraudulent acts of a seller, an ordinary "horse trader" would not be
affected. The colloquial definition as one who engages in "sharp practices" that are "in
conflict with fairness and openness," Kershen, Horse-Tradin" Legal Implications of
Livestock Auction Bidding Practices, 37 ARK. L. Rav. 119, 120 (1983), is more applicable
in this context.
10 A bay mare is a mare with reddish-brown coloration. See WEBSTER's TMtRD
INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY 188 (unabridged 1966).
1 The November sales are the premier mare sales. Although the sale of mares for
breeding does not generate the level of sales volume or gross receipts that is generated
by the yearling sales, the sale of brood mares did rank second to yearlings in 1933.
"7,023 were sold for gross receipts of $240,244,133 an average of $34,208." J. LoHwAN
& A. KIRKPATRICK, SuccFssFuL THOROUGHBRED INVE STENT IN A CHANGING MAar
81 (1984). The Chernicks paid $175,000 for Fiddler's Colleen in 1981. Chernick v. Fasig-
Tipton Ky., Inc., 703 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
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In February, 1982, the mare aborted twin fetuses while at the
Chernick's New York farm.' 2 After being pronounced ready to
breed again in March, 1982, the mare was booked 3 to a stallion
whose efforts did not result in conception. She was then bred
to a less valuable stallion in July, 1982.14
On August 4, 1982, the Chernicks' veterinarian found Fid-
dler's Colleen to be in foal." That finding was confirmed on
September 9, 1982.16 After the first veterinary examination, the
Chernicks entered the mare in Fasig-Tipton's 1982 November
sales. The Chernicks completed a form consignment contract
requiring that the consignors (Chernicks) provide information
regarding broodmares 7 only as to "this year's produce" and
"last year's produce." Fasig-Tipton ordinarily obtained infor-
mation about prior years from a pedigree statistics corporation
whose statistical information normally ran about two years be-
hind.'"
On the consignment contract the Chernicks listed Fiddler's
Colleen's 1981 produce as a colt and her 1982 produce as "slip."'1
9
In accordance with the conditions of sale, the Chernick's veter-
11 The Chernick's veterinarian, Dr. William Bradley, observed and verified this
abortion. 703 S.W.2d at 887. Twins are undesirable in a mare because they may endanger
the mare and are often of little racing value. See Taylor v. Johnston, 539 P.2d 425, 428
(Cal. 1975). Likewise, the abortion of twin fetuses increases "the mare's propensity for
such an occurrence" later and may make the mare "unfit for breeding purposes." 703
S.W.2d at 890.
" A book is "[tihe group of mares being bred to a stallion in one given year."
J. LOHMAN & A. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, at 210.
14 703 S.W.2d at 887.
11 This was the 25-day examination and is generally not as reliable as a 60-day
examination. Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton, No. 83-CI-1365, slip op. at 2, 3 (Fayette Cir.
Ct. Apr. 5, 1984).
,6 This was the 60-day examination and is generally considered reliable in deter-
mining pregnancy status. Id., slip op. at 3.
7 A broodmare is simply a "[flemale thoroughbred used for breeding." J. LOHMAN
& A. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, at 211.
11 Fasig-Tipton relied on Pedigree Associates, Inc., which accesses Jockey Club
statistical information. This information normally was two years behind but in this case
was four years delinquent. 703 S.W.2d at 885. For a discussion of the Jockey Club's
role in the horse industry, see note 174 infra.
W9 703 S.W.2d at 887. The word slip is used interchangeably with the word aborted.
This is consistent with the definition of "slipped" as, "A pregnancy aborted or resorbed
spontaneously." J. LOHMAN & A. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, at 219. The correct
listing for her 1982 produce was "slipped twins." 703 S.W.2d at 887.
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inarian conducted an examination of the mare within ten days
of the sale. The veterinarian completed an examination form
that provided him with five options relating to the mare's breed-
ing status.2' The veterinarian checked the second option, thus
representing that the mare was "barren and free from infec-
tion.,
21
As a result of this examination, Fasig-Tipton officials cor-
rected the official form, marking it "B-okay." That listing was
intended to direct the announcer at the sale that the mare was
not in foal but was barren, apparently free of genital disease
and in sound breeding condition.22
Cloverfield Farm purchased the mare for $85,000.00. Im-
mediately after the fall of the hammer,23 Cloverfield Farm had
the mare examined by a veterinarian recommended by Fasig-
Tipton. Using the same form used by the Chernick's veterinarian
in the pre-sale exam, this veterinarian checked the box for barren
and not in sound breeding condition. 24 Based on this examina-
tion, the buyers declined to accept the mare.25 Following this
- The five options included on the form were:
(1) In foal;
(2) Barren and free from infection;
(3) Maiden, free from infection;
(4) Barren and not in sound breeding condition; and
(5) Maiden and not in sound breeding condition.
703 S.W.2d at 887.
21 Id.
2 The announcement actually made was: " 'She is not in foal, she is barren. The
mare is not in foal.' " 83-CI-1365, slip op. at 7. The sale announcement takes precedence
over the status published in the sales catalog. J. Loi mN & A. KIRnPATIcKc, supra note
11, at 84. Furthermore, an auctioneer's announcement may create an express warranty
when none existed previously. See Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 400 F.2d 112, 114
(2d Cir. 1968). See also U.C.C. § 2-313 (1972), which governs the formation of an
express warranty.
11 The "fall of the hammer" has been clearly established to indicate the finality
of the sale. 703 S.W.2d at 887. See also 400 F.2d at 115; J. LomIAN & A. IOK.uPATmcIC,
supra note 11, at 84-85. "Only upon precisely described circumstances can the drop of
the hammer be held in abeyance or suspended." 703 S.W.2d at 887-88.
14 See note 20 supra.
21 Although the hammer had fallen, the conditions of sale allowed the buyers to
reject the mare if it did not conform to the warranties made at the sale. See note 123
infra and accompanying text. Likewise, the Code grants the right to reject:
Subject to the provisions of this Article on breach in installment contracts
(Section 2-612) and unless otherwise agreed under the sections on contrac-
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rejection, Fasig-Tipton appointed two other veterinarians whose
examinations conflicted somewhat with the examination of the
first veterinarian following the sale.26
The Chernicks refused return of the mare and Fasig-Tipton
refused to return the purchase price, so the buyers shipped
Fiddler's Colleen to their Maryland farm. In Maryland, a final
veterinarian examined the mare and found that her chances of
ever carrying a foal to term were slim. 27 The Chernicks filed suit
against Fasig-Tipton in the Fayette Circuit Court to recover the
purchase price that Cloverfield Farm had paid to Fasig-Tipton.
Cloverfield Farm intervened and demanded rescission, 28 return
tual limitations of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719), if the goods or
tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer
may
(a) reject the whole; or
(b) accept the whole; or
(c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest.
U.C.C. § 2-601 (1972).
- The first of these post-rejection veterinarians "expressed no opinion as to the
mare's breeding status but penciled in 'no gross signs of exudate . . . infection cannot
be ruled out.' " The second post-rejection veterinarian "orally indicated the mare was
sound for breeding but that it would be necessary to suture the horse before she could
carry a foal." 703 S.W.2d at 888.
P There was, therefore, a total of five examinations of Fiddler's Colleen: (1) The
pre-sale examination by Dr. Bradley for the sellers, finding her to be barren and sound
for breeding; (2) The first post-sale exam by Dr. McKee for the purchasers, finding her
barren and not sound for breeding due to infection; (3) The second post-sale exam by
Dr. Cash, hired by the sellers, finding no signs of infection but not ruling out infection
(Dr. McKee had removed the infectious exudate); (4) The third post-sale exam by Dr.
Fishback, hired by Fasig-Tipton, finding that the mare was sound for breeding if sutured;
(5) The final exam by Dr. Brown after the horse had been removed to Maryland. He
found that the chances of the mare carrying a foal to term were slim. Id. As we shall
see, the chronology and findings of these exams are critical to determining the liability
of the sellers and the auctioneer. See notes 134-36 infra and accompanying text.
13 The word rescission is not used in any of the sections of the U.C.C.. The
comment to U.C.C. § 2-608, however, states:
"The section no longer speaks of 'rescission,' a term capable of ambiguous
application either to transfer of title to the goods or to the contract of sale
and susceptible also of confusion with cancellation for cause of an executed
or executory portion of the contract."
U.C.C. § 2-608 comment 1 (1972). Rescission may be the proper term to be applied in
these circumstances. The U.C.C. clearly allows rejection, see § 2-601(a) (1972), and
revocation of acceptance, see § 2-608 (1972). "It is the apparent intention of the drafters
to restrict the word rescission to a rather limited number of cases, those involving a
mistake or in which the seller has committed fraud, duress, or the like." J. WrTE &
R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-1, at
295 (2d ed. 1980).
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of the purchase price and compensatory and punitive damages.
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES: PUNISMNG THE SELLER?
This Note does not undertake to trace the history or devel-
opment of punitive damages. 29 For our purposes, it is sufficient
to have a basic understanding of the theory behind punitive
damages awards. Popular wisdom holds that punitive or exem-
plary damages are a means of punishing a defendant for a wrong
committed against the plaintiff and society in general. 30 As a
corollary, punitive damages are permitted in tort actions due to
the common origins of tort and criminal law and the belief that
the tortfeasor deserves punishment.
3'
In contrast, the general theory of contract damages is "com-
pensation for pecuniary loss.'32 Thus, it is generally held that
punitive damages are not awardable in contract actions. 33 Courts
and commentators have set forth several exceptions to this clearly
For a general discussion of the history and development of punitive damages,
see 1 T. SEDGw rCK, A TREATISE OF THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 347-55 (9th ed. 1920);
Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The Reality and the Illusion of
Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REV. 207, 208-16 (1976-77); Comment, Punitive Damages
in Ordinary Contracts, 42 MONT. L. REV. 93, 93-96 (1981).
See C. MCCORMICK, THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 77 (1935); Coleman, Punitive
Damages for Breach of Contract: A New Approach, 11 STETSON L. REv. 250, 277-78
(1981-82); Sullivan, supra note 29, at 217; Comment, supra note 29, at 93-94. See also
Comment, Zen and the Art of Exemplary Damages Assessment, 72 KY. L.J. 897, 903
(1983-84), in which the author recognizes that recent Kentucky opinions reflect this
punitive purpose. The author also recognizes, however, that Kentucky has not abandoned
the compensatory justification for punitive or exemplary damages. Both of these purposes
seem to underlie the Chernick court's punitive damage award. See Jones, Survey-
Remedies, 74 Ky. L.J. 441, 441 n.4 (1985-86).
,' See Sullivan, supra note 29, at 217 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory
Notes § 901, comment a, at 538 (1939)). See also Coleman, supra note 30, at 278;
Comment, supra note 29, at 93-94.
32 Sullivan, supra note 29, at 218.
" See General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Judd, 400 S.W.2d 685,
688 (Ky. 1966); Wahba v. Don Corlett Motors, Inc., 573 S.W.2d 357, 360 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1978); Louisville Bear Safety Serv., Inc. v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 571 S.W.2d
438, 439 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480, 486 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1978). See also Sullivan, supra note 29, at 207; Note, Exemplary Damages in
Contract Cases, 7 WmaErTa- L.J. 137 (1971); Comment, supra note 29, at 93. But see
Note, In Defense of Punitive Damages, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 303 (1980).
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stated and widely recognized rule. 4 These exceptions fall into
four categories: (1) a contract breach accompanied by an inde-
pendent tort, (2) a contract breach accompanied by fraudulent
conduct, (3) a breach of a fiduciary duty, and (4) a breach of a
special contract. 35 Any of the first three exceptions could apply
in the context of our discussion. The courts, however, have
generally applied only the first two exceptions to horse sales.
36
A. Applying the Uniform Commercial Code Damage Provisions
The New Mexico Supreme Court, in Grandi v. LeSage,
37
combined the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) damage pro-
visions with the concept of contemporaneous fraudulent con-
duct. In Grandi, the buyers of a thoroughbred brought suit
against the seller and his trainer for rescission as well as com-
pensatory and punitive damages." The horse trainer had entered
the seller's horse in a claiming race39 and registered the horse as
14 See, e.g., Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Gruenberg v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1042 (Cal. 1973); Hibschman Pontiac Inc. v. Batchelor,
362 N.E.2d 845, 847 (Ind. 1977); 575 S.W.2d at 486; Stanard v. Bolin, 565 P.2d 94, 98
(Vash. 1977); D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 818 (1973); Coleman, supra note 30, at 250-
51; Sullivan, supra note 29, at 223-51; Comment, supra note 29, at 94-95.
" These special contracts include: A breach of a contract owed to the general
public by a public service company, a breach of a promise to marry, and insurance
contracts. See Coleman, supra note 30, at 251, & n.11; Sullivan, supra note 29, at 220-
51; Comment, supra note 29, at 93.
See Keck v. Wacker, 413 F. Supp. 1377, 1383 (E.D. Ky. 1976); Chernick v.
Fasig-Tipton Ky., Inc., 703 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986); Grandi v. LeSage, 399
P.2d 285, 293 (N.M. 1965). These cases have applied the independent tort and contem-
poraneous fraudulent conduct approaches. If the court takes the fiduciary duty approach
similar to the Chernick circuit court decision, then arguably a breach of this duty could
justify punitive damages. See notes 121-43 infra and accompanying text.
399 P.2d 285 (N.M. 1965).
Id. at 287.
A claiming race is:
An event in which each horse entered is eligible to be purchased at a set
price. Claims must be made before the race and can be made only by
persons who have had a horse claimed at that same meeting or who have
received a claim certificate from the stewards. Claiming races are generally
of a lower class than allowance races; also, the lower the claiming price,
the lower the class.
J. LOHMAN & A. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, at 211. See generally id. at 45-49.
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a chestnut colt when, in fact, the horse was a gelding.' After
claiming the horse and finding it useless for either breeding or
racing, the plaintiff revoked acceptance under U.C.C. section 2-
608 .4 The court granted the plaintiff judgment against the seller
for $3,500.00 representing the purchase price of the gelding, the
40 A gelding is a "male horse who has been castrated." Id. at 214. Because the
buyer in Grandi took possession of the horse following the race, one could argue that
such an obvious defect would preclude the buyer's revocation of acceptance under
U.C.C. § 2-608(1)(b) (1972). See note 41 infra for the text of section 2-603. A failure
to make a customary examination of a thoroughbred and discover obvious defects may
constitute a waiver of the buyer's right to revoke acceptance. See Miron v. Yonkers
Raceway, Inc., 400 F.2d 112, 119-20 (2d Cir. 1968).
The Grandi court found that custom did not require the buyer of the gelding to
inspect and report defects in the horse before acceptance. First, the court found it to be
established custom that a claimant in a claiming race is prohibited from making a prior
inspection of the horse other than a quick glimpse of the horse as it moves from the
paddock to the starting gate. 399 P.2d at 289. Second, the court found that in New
Mexico it was an accepted practice to use medication and to freeze the scrotum. This
draws the organs up so that a horse's running will not be hindered. Id. Therefore it is
nearly impossible even for a careful buyer to determine whether a horse is a colt or a
gelding. Id.
The court in Brodsky v. Nerud, 414 N.Y.S.2d 38 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979), addressed
this distinction between the Miron and Grandi cases. The Brodsky court distinguished
the claiming race-gelding situation because, unlike Miron, the condition could not have
occurred after the sale. Id. at 41. Therefore, the customary lack of a pre-race examination
was of no consequence. Id.
"' U.C.C. § 2-608 provides:
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit
whose non-conformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has
accepted it.
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity would be
cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or
(b) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was
reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery before accept-
ance or by the seller's assurances.
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after
the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before
any substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by
their own defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of
it.
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard
to the goods involved as if he had rejected them.
U.C.C. § 2-608 (1972). This section is of particular importance if the property involved
is a live animal with defects that are difficult to discover. See note 40 supra. See also
400 F.2d at 118; J. WHrrE & R. Summmans, supra note 28, § 8-3, at 311. Other factors
affecting a reasonable time to inspect and revoke are the buyer's sophistication and the
contract of sale. See id. at 310-11. See also 400 F.2d at 120 (interpreting the auction's
conditions of sale).
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expenses incurred in maintaining the horse and $2,500.00 in
punitive damages.
42
The awards of maintenance and punitive damages are so-
called incidental damages awarded pursuant to U.C.C. section
2-715(1). 43 This section allows recovery of damages resulting
from the seller's breach and any other expenses "incident to the
delay or other breach."' 44 The Grandi court believed that section
2-715(1) permitted a recovery of punitive damages "where the
breach is accompanied by fraudulent acts which are wanton,
malicious and intentional." 45 The court awarded damages against
the seller, although the trainer had actually entered the horse in
the race and listed it as a colt.46 Justifying its decision, the court
recognized that the seller ratified his agent's actions in two ways.
First, the seller had seen the track program listing the horse as
a colt 47 when he knew the horse was a gelding. Further, the
seller failed to advise race officials of the error.48 Second, he
failed to return the sales price following the buyer's rejection
and continued to employ the trainer.49 Thus, the seller "received
the benefits of the sale by his acceptance and retention of the
11 399 P.2d at 288.
' U.C.C. § 2-715(1) provides, "(1) incidental damages resulting from the seller's
breach include expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and
care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges,
expenses or commissions in connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable
expense incident to the delay or other breach." U.C.C. § 2-715(1) (1972). These damages
also apply when acceptance is "justifiably revoked." Id. at official comment 1.
"Id.
,7 399 P.2d at 293. The Grandi court did not directly apply section 2-715, but
applied section 2-711, which provides the buyer's general remedies if acceptance of goods
is justifiably revoked. That section allows recovery of damages under Section 2-712. See
U.C.C. § 2-711(1)(a) (1972). Section 2-712 allows recovery of the incidental damages of
section 2-715(1). See U.C.C. § 2-712(2). The leading commentators on the U.C.C. believe
section 2-715 ultimately justified the Grandi court's award. See J. WrTE & R. SUMMERs,
supra note 28, § 10-3, at 384 & n.37.
-7 The defendant argued that he did not ratify his agent's acts and thus should
not be held liable for the misrepresentations. 399 P.2d at 293.
41 The program in this claiming race showed the entries, their names, age, color
and sex. Id. at 289. The program in a claiming race is relied upon by persons qualified
to make a claim. Id. Therefore, a buyer may rely on this data in the same way an
auction purchaser may rely on the data contained in an auction catalog. See note 72
infra and accompanying text.
'7 399 P.2d at 293.
4'7 Id.
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consideration [and could not] reject the burdens incident
thereto, ' 5 specifically the liability for punitive damages.
It is usually difficult to discern which punitive damage ex-
ception a court has applied because of the similar language of
the two exceptions. 5 ' One method of distinguishing which excep-
tion has been applied is to ascertain the U.C.C. section used to
justify the award. Because the Grandi court applied section 2-
715, it is clear that the court believed the punitive damages were
"incident to the delay or other breach."' 52 If so, then the dam-
ages resulted from the contract breach coupled with fraudulent
acts rather than the independent tort of fraud.
If an independent tort warrants recovery of punitive dam-
ages, the recovery springs not from the "contractual duty" but
from "a duty separate from the contract. ' 53 In this vein, section
2-721 allows recovery of contract damages in an action for
fraud.5 4 Therefore, through application of the U.C.C., one can
reach the same result whether the action is based primarily on
a contract breach accompanied by fraudulent conduct, or on an
independent tort accompanied by contract damages. 55
The two approaches differ in the burden of proof. Appli-
cation of the independent tort approach is difficult at best con-
10 Id. at 294.
11 It is very difficult to distinguish between "fraudulent acts" and acts that would
constitute the "independent tort" of fraud. This is especially true if courts applying
both methods use the terms willful, wanton, malicious and oppressive. See Keck v.
Wacker, 413 F. Supp. at 1383; Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton Ky., Inc., 83-CI-1365, slip op.
at 19 (Fayette Cir. Ct. Apr. 5, 1984); 399 P.2d at 293.
'2 U.C.C. § 2-715(l) (1972). See also note 43 supra.
" Comment, supra note 29, at 95.
U.C.C. § 2-721 provides:
Remedies for material misrepresentation or fraud include all remedies
available under this Article for non-fraudulent breach. Neither rescission
or a claim for rescission of the contract for sale nor rejection or return of
the goods shall bar or be deemed inconsistent with a claim for damages or
other remedy.
UCC § 2-721 (1972).
" Arguably, if the damages result from the independent tort then this is not truly
an exception to the general rule that punitive damages are unavailable for breach of
contract. See Comment, supra note 29, at 95. Courts and commentators, however, treat
it as an exception. See Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480, 486 n.3 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1978); Sullivan, supra note 29, at 236-37.
[Vol. 74
1985-861 CHERNICK V. FASIG-TIPTON
sidering the indistinct line between the law of tort and contract.56
This may reduce one's chances of recovery in such an action.57
The contemporaneous conduct approach bears an easier burden
of proof for the plaintiff. As one commentator stated,
"[F]raudulent conduct [may cut] across the whole range of
contractual relations. 58  For example, in Grandi the conduct
supporting the punitive award was evident in the contract for-
mation as well as the attempted revocation. 9 Arguably, fraud-
ulent conduct in only one of these areas would support a punitive
damages award when mere fraudulent conduct is required.
B. Kentucky's Approach to Punitive Damages on Contract
Kentucky has followed the general rule that punitive damages
are not recoverable for a breach of contract action. 60 Kentucky
does recognize an exception when the elements of actionable
fraud accompany a breach. 6' Such a standard requires that the
defendant make a willful, malicious, wanton or oppressive mis-
representation. 62 Therefore, Kentucky has clearly adopted the
independent tort exception to the general rule 3.6
'6 "It assumes too casually that the line between contract and tort may be precisely
drawn; yet marking that boundary line has been acknowledged by some of our ablest
scholars to be among the most perplexing challenges in the law." Sullivan, supra note
29, at 229-30. See Comment, supra note 29, at 95.
'7
If [this exception] is applied correctly, no amount of fraud in the contract
transaction will warrant punitive damages if there is no tort present arising
from breach of a duty separate from the ordinary contractual duty. Such
a separate duty can be present between parties although their relationship
is originally created by the contract.
Comment, supra note 29, at 95. For a discussion of the duty in thoroughbred horse
cases, see notes 165-69 infra and accompanying text.
" Comment, supra note 29, at 95.
' See text accompanying notes 47-50 supra.
' See General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Judd, 400 S.W.2d at 688;
Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cartwright Creek Tel. Co., 108 S.W. 875, 878 (Ky.
1908); Wvahba v. Don Corbett Motors, Inc., 573 S.W.2d at 360; Ford Motor Co. v.
Mayes, 575 S.W.2d at 486; Louisville Bear Safety Serv., Inc. v. South Cent. Bell Tel.
Co., 571 S.W.2d at 439.
575 S.W.2d at 486 n.3.
See Keck v. Wacker, 413 F. Supp. at 1383.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals expressly rejected the contemporaneous fraud-
ulent conduct exception. "We recognize that some courts have awarded punitive damages
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The relatively few Kentucky cases in which the plaintiff has
successfully recovered punitive damages in an action stemming
from a contract breach evidence the implications of the inde-
pendent tort approach (i.e., the difficulty of the plaintiff's bur-
den of proof).64 Although this may be explained by the Kentucky
courts' aversion to punitive damages, 6s the better explanation
seems to be the inability of plaintiffs to meet their burden of
proving the independent tort.66
C. A Prologue: Keck v. Wacker
Although the plaintiff in Keck v. Wacker67 failed to establish
the existence of an independent tort, no discussion of Chernicc
would be complete without an analysis of Keck. Keck planted
the seed for the Chernick court's analysis of the punitive dam-
ages issue6s and the plaintiff's ability to prove the existence of
an independent tort.6
9
1. The Facts of Keck
The facts of Keck and Chernick are strikingly similar. In
Keck, a mare named Plage was listed in the Keeneland sales
catalog as "Produce record: 1973 Barren. ' 70 This information
had been provided by Claiborne Farm, the seller's agent. When
sold at the Keeneland January sales, the mare was in foal .7
in contract actions without finding a separate tort. . . . However, this court has no
authority to disregard the opinions of the Supreme Court of Kentucky or its predecessor
court even if we desired to do so." 575 S.W.2d at 486 n.3. See also Feathers v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty, 667 S.W.2d 693 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) (recognizing an independent
tort action for breach of insurer's covenant to act in good faith).
m In most cases recognizing the exception of an independent tort, the plaintiff has
been limited to contract damages. See, e.g., 413 F. Supp. at 1383-84; 573 S.W.2d at
360; 575 S.W.2d at 487; 571 S.W.2d at 439.
5 See Hensley v. Paul Miller Ford, Inc., 508 S.W.2d 759, 764 (Ky. 1974) (Reed,
J., concurring) (suggesting that punitive damages should be abolished in Kentucky). See
also 575 S.W.2d at 486 n.3.
See cases cited supra note 64.
67 413 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. Ky. 1976).
1 See notes 79-88, 99-103 infra and accompanying text.
" See notes 89-94, 104-08 infra and accompanying text.
7,, 413 F. Supp. at 1380.
71 Id.
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Relying on the catalog data,72 Mrs. Wacker, through her son
and a bloodstock agent, 73 was the successful bidder at
$117,000.00. Shortly thereafter the mare slipped the foal that
she was carrying when sold. 74 Mrs. Wacker's son subsequently
discovered that the mare had slipped in 1972, 75 contrary to the
produce record as represented in the sales catalog. Wacker's son
was unable to contact the seller or Keeneland's sales director by
telephone, so he wrote letters to both parties indicating that the
sale should be "null and void." ' 76 Keck, the seller, refused to
nullify the sale and demanded payment. Wacker refused to
tender the purchase price, and Keck instituted a suit for a
judgment on the sales price.77 Wacker counterclaimed seeking
rescission 78 as well as punitive damages.
2. "Slipped" Versus "Barren" and the Usage of Trade
To understand the Keck court's decision regarding punitive
damages, one must analyze the court's approach to settling what
72 "It is customary for buyers to rely entirely upon the catalog data when pur-
chasing a horse at these auctions." Id. See also Overstreet v. Norden Laboratories, Inc.,
669 F.2d 1286, 1290 (6th Cir. 1982) (catalog description may create an express warranty);
Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton Ky., Inc., 703 S.W.2d at 887 (recognizing the high degree of
reliance placed upon the catalog by buyers). For a discussion concerning the various
portions of the thoroughbred sales catalog, see J. LoHmAN & A. KuucpARIcx, supra
note 11, at 83-102.
" A bloodstock agent is an agent "who represents the purchaser or seller (or both)
of thoroughbreds at public or private sale, generally in exchange for a commission." J.
LoHmAN & A. KmKPATRiCK, supra note 11, at 210. See also id. at 36 (discussing the
pros and cons of hiring a bloodstock agent).
14 413 F. Supp. at 1380. The mare slipped the foal shortly after being shipped to
Spendthrift Farm in Lexington. The slip was caused by a viral infection, not by any
mishandling after the sale. Id.
71 Id. Mr. Wacker was informed that the mare had slipped in 1972. Wacker
attempted to verify this by calling Claiborne Farm, where the horse had been boarded
prior to sale. Claiborne's veterinarian informed Wacker that the farm's records indicated
"that the mare had been declared in foal and then was declared barren." Id.
76 Id. This was an effective revocation because it was made shortly after discovery
of the defect. See id. For the text of U.C.C. § 2-608 on revocation of acceptance, see
note 41 supra.
" This action is permitted in U.C.C. § 2-709, which provides in pertinent part:
"(1) When the buyer fails to pay the price as it becomes due the seller may recover,
together with any incidental damages under the next section, the price (a) of goods
accepted .... ." U.C.C. § 2-709 (1972).
13 For a discussion of the word rescission, see note 28 supra.
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may be termed the "slipped" versus "barren" controversy.7 9 As
mentioned, Keck had reported the mare's produce record as
"barren" rather than "slipped. ' 80 The court and the parties
agreed that "barren" meant "bred and did not conceive," while
"slipped" meant "bred, conceived and then aborts its foal.",,'
The disagreement centered around the application of these def-
initions. More precisely, the disagreement concerned the proper
listing of a mare that is bred and found to be in foal, but on a
subsequent examination is found to be "empty" with no sign
of a fetus.8 2 Keck asserted that such a mare should be listed as
"barren," while Wacker argued that such a mare should be
listed as "slipped."" 3
Both parties offered experts supporting their side of the
controversy8 4 The court applied the definition of usage of trade
embodied within U.C.C. section 1-205(2)"5 and held that listing
the mare as barren "was not in accordance with a usage of trade
in the thoroughbred horse industry. 8 6 The mare thereby failed
The primary controversy in Keck centered around the use of these terms. See
413 F. Supp. at 1380-81. See also Cohan, The Uniform Commercial Code as Applied
to Implied Warranties of "Merchantability" and "Fitness" in the Sale of Horses, 73
Ky. L.J. 665, 691-92 (1984-85).
" See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
81 413 F. Supp. at 1381.
.2 Id.
Id.
Keck's assertion that such a mare should be listed as barren was supported by
Claiborne Farm and C.V. Whitney Farm. According to the court, this was also approved,
"to some degree," by the Executive Secretary of the Jockey Club, which is the record-
keeping authority for the thoroughbred horse pedigrees. Id. See also note 174 infra.
Wacker's assertion was supported by veterinarians, the general manager of the
California Thoroughbred Breeders Association, the owner of Normandy Farm, and John
A. Bell, who is the owner of a horse farm and bloodstock agency and former member
of the Kentucky Racing Commission. 413 F. Supp. at 1381.
' U.C.C. § 1-205(2) provides:
(2) A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such
regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an
expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in
question. The existence and scope of such a usage are to be proved as
facts. If it is established that such a usage is embodied in a written trade
code or similar writing the interpretation of the writing is for the court.
U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1972). For a general discussion of usage of trade in the thoroughbred
horse industry, see Miller, supra note 7.
" 413 F. Supp. at 1381. Because there is no trade code for the thoroughbred horse
industry, the usage of trade was determined by weighing the conflicting testimony on
the issue. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 74
CHERNICK v. FAsIG-TIPTON
to conform to the contract description, 7 and her value to Mrs.
Wacker was substantially impaired. s8 Because a material misre-
presentation existed, the court addressed the propriety of puni-
tive damages.
3. The Tortious Requirements: Willful and Wanton
The Keck court recognized that punitive damages were re-
coverable but that "the defendants [buyers] have the burden of
proving fraud by clear and convincing proof." 9 To meet this
burden, the defrauded buyer must prove six essential elements:
(1) That [the seller] made a material representation;
(2) that it was false;
(3) that when he made it he knew it was false, or made it
recklessly, without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive
assertion;
(4) that he made it with intention of inducing [the buyer] to
act, or that it should be acted upon by [the buyer];
(5) that [the buyer] acted in reliance upon it, and
(6) that [the buyer] thereby suffered injury.9°
Applying this list of essential elements to the facts in Keck,91 the
court held that the catalog description was not done "willfully,
maliciously, wantonly or oppressively. ' 92 Two facts supported
this holding. First, Keck had relied upon Claiborne Farm to list
the mare in the sales catalog, an act in accordance with the
practice in the industry.93 Second, and most important, Clai-
413 F. Supp. at 1381.
- Mrs. Wacker's son testified that the mare would have been wQrth about $40,000
if it had been listed as "slipped." In comparison, Mrs. Wacker paid $117,000 for a
"barren" mare. Id. at 1382.
- 413 F. Supp. at 1383 (citing Terrill v. Carpenter, 143 F. Supp. 747 (E.D. Ky.
1956), aff'd, 249 F.2d 142 (6th Cir. 1957); Sanford Constr. Co. v. S & H Contractors,
Inc., 443 S.W.2d 227 (Ky. 1969)).
Id. (citing 443 S.W.2d at 231).
' See notes 70-78 supra and accompanying text.
413 F. Supp. at 1383.
Id. at 1382.
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borne Farms properly relied on a Jockey Club interpretation as
to the listing of the mare and "acted upon an honest belief in
what it did." ' 94 As a result, the catalog misdescription was an
innocent misrepresentation rather than actionable fraud.
D. Chernick: Picking Up Where Keck Left Off
At first glance, Chernick and Keck appear identical. Cher-
nick, however, is "precisely the opposite of Keck."95 Yet, it is
quite possible that Chernick may have been decided differently
had Keck not preceded it. A state court is not necessarily bound
by federal district court precedent. Nevertheless, Keck made two
important pronouncements for the Chernick court. First, Keck
established the proper labeling of a mare determined to be in
foal and later found to be empty with no evidence of a fetus.96
Second, it set definite criteria for determining what actions would
support a punitive damages award.
Clearly, mares of the type involved in Keck must be listed
as "slipped" rather than "barren." 9 According to Keck, this
was "the logical and legal inference to be made." 99 A seller
could no longer argue that usage of trade allowed him to list
the horse as "barren" rather than "slipped." In effect, case law
had determined usage of trade. 00 What had once been a question
of fact, open to debate,'0' became a matter of law determined
by reference to prior case law, in this instance the Ieck deci-
sion. 0 2
w Id.
91 Appellee's Reply Brief at 15, Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton Ky., Inc., 703 S.W.2d
885. This difference lies in the presence of evil intent in Chernick that was lacking in
Keck. Id. at 15-16. See also notes 105-08 infra and accompanying text (listing the specific
elements of the seller's fraud in Chernick).
Keck v. Wacker, 413 F. Supp. at 1381.
' See 413 F. Supp. at 1383-84. See also notes 103-08 infra and accompanying text
(application of the Keck criteria to the facts of Chernick).
413 F. Supp. at 1381.
Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton Kentucky, Inc., No. 83-CI-1365, slip op. at 5.
1w It is questionable whether Keck actually determined usage of trade or whether
Keck merely reported what the usage of trade should be. In any event, the industry
usage has conformed to the Keck decision. See, e.g., J. LOHMAN & A. KiRiPATIuCK,
supra note 11, at 84 (discussing the definition and implication of "slipped").
1o See note 84 supra.
,01 The Chernick court did not ponder the question of the proper listing of Fiddler's
Colleen. The circuit court merely relied on the Keck court's decision as to the proper
listing. See No. 83-CI-1365, slip op. at 5-6.
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Because the facts established that the sellers in Chernick had
listed the mare contrary to established law, the court turned its
attention to the fraud question. Applying the Keck requirements'03
and holding that the sellers acted fraudulently, the court awarded
punitive damages.104 Supporting this decision, the court desig-
nated four crucial aspects of the seller's actions: (1) the knowl-
edge of critical facts, 05 (2) the duty to review the catalog
descriptions and report mistakes, 1' 6 (3) a reckless or wanton
disregard for the rights of others, 0 7 and (4) a breach of good
faith following notice of rejection by the buyer.
08
Under the Keck standard all four of these elements, in one
form or another, must be present.' 9 In a Grandi v. LeSage"0
jurisdiction, where punitive damages require only fraudulent acts
accompanying the breach of contract,"' the buyer need only
show acts that are "wanton in character and maliciously inten-
tional."'1 2 The Keck-Chernick standard is clearly the better rule.
A seller can be more sure of exactly what his or her liability
may be. Under a Grandi approach, acts that alone do not
constitute fraud may impose punitive liability on an unsuspecting
seller. For example, the seller in Grandi was not permitted the
"o, See text accompanying note 90 supra.
CM The Chernick court granted the buyers $40,000 in punitive damages. 703 S.W.2d
at 888.
"'s Although the Chernicks were "relative novices in the thoroughbred industry,"
the court found that they were aware of the importance of disclosing all of the facts of
a mare's breeding history. Mr. Chernick was admittedly aware that Fiddler's Colleen
was a "problem mare," yet these facts were "deliberately and consciously suppressed."
This "suppression" amounted to "conscious wrongdoing," 703 S.W.2d at 889 (citing
Fowler v. Mantooth, 683 S.W.2d 250 (Ky. 1984)). It also demonstrated the Chernicks'
"wanton disregard for the rights of others," 703 S.W.2d at 889 (quoting the trial court
and citing Hensley v. Paul Miller Ford, Inc., 508 S.W.2d 759 (Ky. 1974); Island Creek
Coal Co. v. Rodgers, 664 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982)).
- 83-CI-1365, slip op. at 18.
" Id., slip op. at 19.
- "[Tihe Plaintiffs knew they had misrepresented the mare and good faith would
have required them to have taken her back." Id. at 20.
' See 413 F. Supp. at 1383. See also text accompanying note 90 supra. The four
elements present in Chernick fulfilled the six requirements of fraud enunciated in Keck.
Therefore, these four aspects supported a punitive damages award. 703 S.W.2d at 889.
399 P.2d 285 (N.M. 1965).
See notes 43-52 supra and accompanying text. But cf. Comment, supra note 29,
at 95 (Some jurisdictions require the existence of a tort independent of the contract.).
M 399 P.2d at 293.
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same type of reliance on his agent's actions as was the seller in
Keck." 3 Those disagreeing with the Chernick decision because
of its possible detrimental effect on the horse industry should
feel heartened by the court's acceptance of this tougher standard.
Coming full circle, we return to the purpose for awarding
punitive damages. If Kentucky continues to apply the independ-
ent tort exception to the general rule, a breach of duty "separate
from the ordinary contractual duty""14 will be required. In other
words, Kentucky courts should award punitive damages only
when the defendant's actions evidence "a spirit of mischief or
criminal indifference to civil obligations.""' 5 As we shall see, the
nature of the industry under scrutiny may affect this determi-
nation." 6 If this is true, then obviously punitive damages are not
available for every contract breach. Because of the prominence
of the horse industry in Kentucky, however, the court may have
an easier time finding an independent tort.
III. LIABILITY OF THE AUCTIONEER
The second important holding of Chernick is that an aucti-
oneer may be jointly liable for a seller's fraudulent acts." 7 There
are two approaches to making such a determination, and a
comparison of the circuit and appellate court decisions in Cher-
nick illustrates these variant theories. The Fayette Circuit Court
found that Fasig-Tipton, as auctioneer, breached a fiduciary
duty owed to both the buyer and the seller." 8 The second theory,
adopted by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, was that Fasig-
Tipton negligently dictated the terms of the sale and conducted
"I Compare 399 P.2d at 293 (quoting Adrian v. Elmer, 284 P.2d 599, 603 (Kan.
1955)) (principal's failure to promptly repudiate his agent's acts resulted in ratification)
with 413 F. Supp. at 1382 (seller's reliance on her agent's actions resulted in innocent
misrepresentation by the seller).
"' Comment, supra note 29, at 95.
"I Wahba v. Don Corlett Motors, 573 S.W.2d 357, 360 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978)
(quoting Bisset v. Goss, 481 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Ky. 1972)); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Jones
Adm'r, 180 S.W.2d 555, 588 (Ky. 1944).
116 See notes 163-69 infra and accompanying text.
"I See Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton Ky., Inc., 703 S.W.2d 885, 887-90 (Ky. Ct. App.
1986).
I's Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton Ky., Inc., No. 83-CI-1365, slip op. at 23-24 (Fayette
Cir. Ct. Apr. 5, 1984).
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the sale according to those terms."19 In addition to these theories,
both courts agreed that the auctioneer's attempts to limit liability
and the public policy surrounding Kentucky's thoroughbred in-
dustry supported a finding that Fasig-Tipton should be jointly
and severally liable for compensatory damages.' 20
A. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
The Fayette Circuit Court clearly stated that "an auctioneer,
while primarily the agent of the seller in making the sale, is for
some purposes the agent of both parties." '' 2' Clarifying this
initial finding, the court determined that Fasig-Tipton had failed
to properly conduct the sale according to the conditions embod-
ied in the consignment contract.'" Specifically, the court em-
phasized Fasig-Tipton's breach of a fiduciary duty in the
enforcement of the tenth condition of sale, which stated in
pertinent part:
Any brood mare so examined whose pregnancy status and/or
breeding is found not to be as represented in the veterinarian's
certificate provided by consignor... may be returned to con-
signor as unsold .... In the event of a material difference in
findings between the veterinarians acting for consignor and
buyer ... a third veterinarian shall be designated by the auc-
tioneer ... who shall examine the mare to determine whether
or not she may be returned under this CONDITION ... "I
An understanding of this condition is critical because it is nearly
identical to conditions that exist in all thoroughbred auction
sales.'2 4 Regardless of the theory used, the interpretation of this
See 703 S.W.2d at 890.
See id. at 890 (In this case, Fasig-Tipton was not liable to Cloverfield Farm for
compensatory damages solely because no claim was asserted against Fasig-Tipton for
such damages.); No. 83-CI-1365, slip op. at 22-24.
- Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton Ky., Inc., No. 83-CI-1365, slip op. at 23 (citing 7A
C.J.S. Auctions and Auctioneers § 5, at 860 (1980); Parke v. Spurlin, 268 S.W.2d 33,
35 (Ky. 1954)).
'- Id.
'-" Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton Ky., Inc., 703 S.W.2d at 888. The circuit court quoted
the condition much more extensively. See No. 83-CI-1365, slip op. at 7-8. The appellate
court quoted only that part of the condition emphasized by the circuit court.
'4' See J. LOHMAN & A. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, at 83-84. There has been
some effort to standardize these conditions throughout the industry. There remain,
however, minor differences that require a prudent buyer to examine closely the condi-
tions. Id. at 85.
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condition is crucial to a determination of the auctioneer's liabil-
ity.1
25
Although the circuit and appellate courts believed that Fasig-
Tipton was negligent in its enforcement of this provision, 26 the
circuit court also found that Fasig-Tipton failed to apply this
condition impartially, in derogation of its fiduciary duty to both
parties. 27 While the court's fiduciary relationship approach was
almost indistinguishable from the court's negligence theory,
28
there are apparently two instances in which a breach of a dual
fiduciary duty may occur.
The first possible breach in Chernick was Fasig-Tipton's
appointment of a "referee" veterinarian. 29 Rather than accept-
ing the opinion of the first veterinarian it suggested immediately
following the sale, 30 Fasig-Tipton appointed a second veterinar-
ian to examine Fiddler's Colleen.' 3' This suggests that Fasig-
Tipton may have been engaging in opinion shopping to assure
that it received its commission at all costs, clearly short of the
fair dealing required of an agent. 32 The vulnerability of Fasig-
2I Although the appellate and circuit courts implemented different theories, both
relied upon Fasig-Tipton's interpretation and application of this condition. See 703
S.W.2d at 888; No. 83-CI-1365, slip op. at 7-8. A court must consider such a condition
when addressing an auctioneer's liability since "this section of the catalog is written
primarily for the protection of the sales company .. ." J. LoNMAN & A. KIKPATrICK,
supra note 11, at 83.
,26 See notes 173-210 infra and accompanying text.
127 See notes 121-22 supra and accompanying text.
'1 This can be attributed to the necessity of interpreting the tenth condition of
sale. See notes 123-25 supra and accompanying text.
1 9 The "referee" veterinarian is the third veterinarian and is to be designated by
the auctioneer. See text accompanying note 123 supra.
11 This second post-sale examination did not rule out the infection found by the
buyer's veterinarian. See note 27 supra.
1"i Id.
"2 If the auctioneer is an agent of both parties, the Restatement (Second) of Agency
imposes specific duties:
An agent who, to the knowledge of two principals, acts for both of them
in a transaction between them, has a duty to act with fairness to each and
to disclose to each all facts which he knows or should know would
reasonably affect the judgment of each in permitting such dual agency,
except as to a principal who has manifested that he knows such facts or
does not care to know them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 392 (1958). A failure to appoint veterinarians in
accordance with the contract terms is not fair to both parties if the additional veteri-
narians can only harm the buyer's position.
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Tipton to this argument was compounded by Fasig-Tipton's
insistence that the parties abide by the conditions of the sale,'
3
conditions that Fasig-Tipton failed to carry out properly.
The second possible breach of a dual fiduciary duty was
Fasig-Tipton's improper enforcement of the tenth condition.
Regardless of the number of veterinarians appointed to examine
Fiddler's Colleen, she remained unsound for breeding pur-
poses.' 34 Once this was discovered, Fasig-Tipton had a duty to
accept the buyer's rejection or revocation of acceptance.' 35 Like
the failure to accept the first veterinarian's opinion, the failure
to void the sale increased the seller's chances of prevailing be-
cause the buyer would have to bring suit to recover the purchase
price paid. Assuming the auction company owed a fiduciary
duty to the buyer, failure to void the sale would violate that
duty. 136
That an auctioneer is a buyer's agent is indeed an assump-
tion, despite the circuit court's holding to the contrary.'37 Al-
though courts have held that an auctioneer is for some pur-
poses an agent of both the seller and buyer,' 38 those holdings
have been limited to specific types of auctioneers'3 9 or
"I Following the two post-sale examinations, see note 27 supra, the buyer and
sellers were discussing an alternative course of action (a 30-day trial of the mare) when
the vice president and general manager of Fasig-Tipton interjected. "That is an extra-
neous warranty which Fasig-Tipton cannot be a part of. It is not part of the conditions
of sale. We must get a third veterinarian, a referee veterinarian, and must make that
decision now as to who that vet is going to be." No. 83-CI-1365, slip op. at 11.
Therefore, the buyer and seller were denied the "freedom to negotiate." Id.
14 This was evidenced by the testimony of the final veterinarian to examine Fiddler's
Colleen. See note 27 supra. That veterinarian found that the mare had serious "confir-
mation defects" and a chronic infection "of long standing [that] clearly existed at the
time Fiddler's Colleen was sold." No. 83-CI-1365, slip op. at 13. Based on this testimony,
the court found that the mare was "not in sound breeding condition at the fall of the
hammer." Id.
No. 83-CI-1365, slip op. at 16.
"4Id.
See id., slip op. at 23 (citing 7A C.J.S. Auctions and Auctioneers § 5 (1980);
268 S.W.2d at 5).
"I See Melheiser v. Central Trust Co., 36 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Ky. 1931); Mathis v.
Martin, 228 S.W. 431, 432 (Ky. 1921); Garth v. Davis & Johnson, 85 S.W. 692, 693
(Ky. 1905).
"1 For example, all Kentucky cases holding that an auctioneer is an agent of both
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duties.' 40 This concept should not be expanded automatically to
the realm of the thoroughbred auctioneer. Fasig-Tipton and the
other thoroughbred auction companies are independent corpo-
rations with interests in earning a commission from the seller.'
4'
The auctioneer should not be required to jeopardize that com-
mission by telling the purchaser that the mare is not worth the
price paid even though the mare has no physical defects. Clearly
such a statement would "affect the judgment" of the buyer in
deciding whether to bid on the mare. 42 This, however, is the
function of the buyer's independent agent,' 43 and there is no
need to impose such a duty on the auctioneer.
The better approach begins with the proposition that the
auctioneer is the seller's agent. This is the traditional view of
the courts addressing auctioneer agency in general' 44 and in the
parties involve the sale of realty. See cases cited supra note 138. See also Parke v.
Spurlin, 268 S.W.2d 33.
,4 The general rule is that "the auctioneer is also treated as the agent of the
purchaser for the purpose of making the written evidence at the time of the sale, but
his authority to represent the purchaser is thus limited." Johnson v. Haynes, 532 S.W.2d
561, 564-65 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975) (citing Green v. Crye, 11 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tenn.
1928)). See also Schwinn v. Griffith, 303 N.W.2d 258, 262 (Minn. 1981) (auctioneer is
an agent of the buyer to the extent he binds the buyer through the memorandum of
sale.); Tulsa Auto Dealers Auction v. North Side State Bank, 431 P.2d 408, 412 (Okla.
1966) (auctioneer is an agent of the buyer only after the hammer falls). The nature of
the double agency may be explained as follows:
While an auctioneer is an agent of both seller and purchaser for
signing a contract of sale, it does not follow that his agency for the one
is coextensive in its nature and duration with that for the other; his agency
for the purchaser is usually conferred when the bid is accepted and begins
at the fall of the hammer. Such an authority must be exercised contem-
poraneously with the sale; but his agency for the seller is generally more
extensive, and may cover time both before and after the sale.
7A C.J.S. Auctions and Auctioneers § 5, at 860-61 n.75 (1980). This is a crucial
distinction in a case such as Chernick in which misrepresentations exist before the sale
and the auctioneer's negligence appears following the sale.
14, They are, however, "affected with a public interest and therefore should be held
to a higher standard of honesty, integrity and performance than an ordinary private
corporation." 83-CI-1365, slip op. at 23.
,41 An agent must disclose any facts that "affect the judgment" of the buyer.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 392 (1958). See note 132 supra for the text of
section 392.
,41 See J. LOHMAN & A. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, at 31-40.
'" See, e.g., Becker v. Crabb, 4 S.W.2d 370, 371 (Ky. 1928); In re Premier
Container Corp., 408 N.Y.S.2d 725, 729 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978). See also 7A C.J.S.
Auctions and Auctioneers § 5 (1980).
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context of a thoroughbred auction sale.' 4 This approach may,
once again, require that a distinction be made between contract
and fraud actions.
Just as in the punitive damages issue, Grandi v. LeSage'46
presents both the U.C.C. and the breach of contract approaches
to discerning an agent's liability. Grandi did not involve an
auctioneer but did consider the liability of the seller's agent, in
that case the trainer.' 47 Recall that the trainer had entered the
horse in a claiming race and registered the horse as a colt when,
in fact, the trainer knew that the horse was a gelding.' 48 The
New Mexico Supreme Court held the trainer not liable for any
damages resulting from the seller's breach.' 49 Relying on the
U.C.C.'s lack of authority, the court found "nothing therein
evidencing an intent that an agent of the seller shall be held
liable along with the seller."' 50 Thus, in an action in which only
U.C.C. damages are sought, the seller's agent is not liable.',
The Louisiana decision of Castille v. Folck'52 supports this
proposition. The Castille court agreed that an action based on
contract, seeking rescission and damages, was unavailable against
the seller's agent, in that case, the auctioneer.'53 The court did
"I See Miron & Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 400 F.2d 112, 113 (2d Cir. 1968); Castille
v. Folck, 338 So. 2d 328, 331 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
"4 399 P.2d at 285.
,,7 Id. at 290-91.
1'4 Id. at 288-89. See also notes 39-40 supra and accompanying text.
,,9 The court held the trainer not liable for return of the purchase price because he
did not receive any of the purchase price from the buyer. Id. at 290. As a corollary to
this holding, the trainer was also held not liable for incidental damages incurred "in the
care and custody of the goods." Id. Finally, punitive damages were not recoverable
because there had been no recovery of compensatory damages against the trainer. Id. at
291.
' Id. at 290. Although the court was referring to expenses related to the upkeep
of the gelding, it was this failure to award incidental damages that also limited the
recovery of punitive damages against the agent. See note 149 supra.
" ' This is assuming that the agent did not receive any of the buyer's purchase
price. If the auctioneer holds the sales proceeds, as in the ordinary thoroughbred
consignment situation, that auctioneer may be liable to the buyer for the purchase price
held. See U.C.C. § 2-711(l) (1972) (buyer may recover purchase price paid); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 339 (1958) (agent's duty to return items received if the
transaction is rescinded for a cause existing at the time of receipt by the agent).
338 So. 2d 328 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
Id. at 332. Specifically, the Castille court held, "We know of no authority ...
which would authorize a suit for rescission of sale being brought against the agent of
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hold, however, that the plaintiff-buyer's allegations did support
an action ex delicto'5 4 based on the misrepresentations of the
seller and auctioneer. 55 The Castille court found the auctioneer
personally liable because he had "pledge[d] his own responsibil-
ity" by making "the rules of the game."1 6 Thus, under Castille,
once an auctioneer dictates the terms defining the relationship
of the parties, he assumes an additional responsibility to the
buyer.'5 7 This is the same approach that the circuit court in
Chernick used to determine agency liability,'5 . and it was also
the crux of the appellate court's negligence theory. 5 9
B. Negligence of the Auctioneer
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Chernick did not use the
word "agent" in its opinion. It is unclear whether this omission
the seller. A suit for rescission of sale, be it for error of fact or redhibition, must be
brought against the seller." Id. This holding is in line with the approach taken by the
Restatement: "Unless otherwise agreed, a person making or purporting to make a
contract with another as agent for a disclosed principal does not become a party to the
contract." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 320 (1958). See also REsTATE ENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 328 (1958) (An agent is not liable for nonperformance of a
contract to which he is not a party.).
'4 338 So. 2d at 332. An action ex delicto in this case is an action in tort. See
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 509 (5th ed. 1979). See also Sayers & Muir Service Station v.
Indian Refining Co., 100 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Ky. 1936).
'1 338 So. 2d at 332. The auctioneer had sold a broodmare named Flying Cobre
and misrepresented that the mare had been Coggins tested and that a Coggins certificate
would be furnished to the purchaser. Id. at 330-32.
A Coggins test is a test used to determine whether a horse is a carrier of "Equine
Infections Anemia," a malady more commonly known as swamp fever. Id. at 331 n.1.
See also J. LomAN & A. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, at 212. A Coggins certificate is
merely proof that the test was negative. 338 So. 2d at 331 n.1.
"6 338 So. 2d at 333 (quoting the trial court). This brought the situation in Castille
outside the realm of the general rule that "an agent is not responsible to third persons
where his principal is disclosed." Id. See also note 153 supra.
,,7 338 So. 2d 333. Specifically, in the thoroughbred consignment industry:
It is the agent who, in effect, says to the principal, "I will sell your horses
for you if you meet the standard and representations I make to prospective
purchasers." There can be little doubt that under these circumstances, [the
auctioneer] obligated himself to make sure all horses met the requirements
as advertised.
Id. (quoting the trial court).
" The Fayette County Circuit Court held that thoroughbred auction companies
have the duty to provide the rules and regulations governing the sale of thoroughbreds
at auction. "In this case the Defendant, Fasig-Tipton, ha[d] undertaken to perform that
duty by unilaterally dictating the terms and conditions of sale." No. 83-CI-1365, slip
op. at 22.
'1 See 703 S.W.2d at 889-90.
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was intentional. The court did adopt the circuit court opinion
in two specific areas: The awarding of punitive damages16 and
Fasig-Tipton's public responsibility.' 6' The opinion, however, did
not specifically adopt the circuit court's agency theory. The court
of appeals decision recognized that a judicial admission rendered
the sellers liable for the entire compensatory damage award. 62
The court felt compelled, however, to opine what damages an
auctioneer in Fasig-Tipton's position should pay. Therefore, the
court's dictum imposes a liability on the auctioneer worth ex-
amination.
Whether a defendant is negligent in any given situation de-
pends on the standard of conduct applied. The Chernick court
held that Fasig-Tipton's actions were not to be "reviewed at a
level lower than that of strict scrutiny.' ' 63 This is consistent with
the idea that auction sales companies, by dictating the terms of
the sale,' 64 have assumed the duty of "fostering" and "encour-
aging" the "thoroughbred horse industry within the Common-
wealth" of Kentucky. 65 Kentucky legislative policy aims at
promoting the thoroughbred industry. 66 Kentucky statutes, how-
- "This court is in complete agreement with the Fayette Circuit Court's findings
and conclusions and will not disturb the award of punitive damages." Chernick v. Fasig-
Tipton Ky., Inc., id. at 888.
,6! Id. at 890.
,,1 Id. at 889. Counsel for the buyers stated in court: " 'We don't make any claim
for any other damages, or any damages, other than the return of our money against
Fasig-Tipton' " Id. The court held that this statement fell within the definition of a
judicial admission. Id. See also Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109, 114 (Ky. 1968)
(quoting Sutherland v. Davis, 151 S.W.2d 1021, 1024 (Ky. 1941)) (A judicial admission
is a "formal act done in the course of judicial proceedings."); George M. Eady v.
Stevenson, 550 S.W.2d 473, 473-74 (Ky. 1977) ("The doctrine of judicial admissions
should be applied only when the statements are unequivocal and must be considered to
be deliberately true or false.") Therefore, the court held that Fasig-Tipton was absolved
of liability. 703 S.W.2d at 889.
703 S.W.2d at 890.
'' See note 158 supra.
Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton Ky., Inc., No. 83-CI-1365, slip op. at 22.
Kentucky Revised Statutes § 230.215 provides in pertinent part:
It is the policy of the commonwealth of Kentucky, in furtherance of its
responsibility to foster and to encourage legitimate occupations and indus-
tries in the commonwealth and to promote and to conserve the public
health safety, and welfare, and it is hereby declared the intent of the
commonwealth to foster and to encourage the thoroughbred horse breeding
industry within the commonwealth and to encourage the improvement of
the breed of thoroughbred horses. ...
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 230.215(l) (Bobbs-Merrill 1982) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
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ever, center on the racing aspect of the industry' 67 and leave
largely unregulated the sales aspect. 68 Thus, the Chernick court
determined that auction companies have assumed "the duty of
providing the rules and regulations which govern the sale of
thoroughbred horses by auction in Kentucky."'' 69 Partially based
on this civic responsibility, Fasig-Tipton's negligence was evident
in three instances: (1) The drafting of the consignment form,
7 0
(2) the failure to assure the accuracy of the seller's representa-
tions in the sales catalog,' 7' and (3) the interpretation and en-
forcement of the contract. 72
1. The Consignment Form
The consignment form drafted by Fasig-Tipton required that
the seller provide information regarding a broodmare's current
and immediately preceeding year's produce. 7  Fasig-Tipton was
to obtain information on previous years from a private corpo-
ration having access to Jockey Club statistical information.' 74
Furthermore, the conditions of sale defined "barren" to mean
"the mare was bred, was not found to have slipped and failed
to produce a foal.' ' 7- This would allow a veterinarian to list a
67 See KRS §§ 230.210-.360 (1982 & Cum. Supp. 1984). The intent of these sections
is to "vest in the [racing] commission forceful control of thoroughbred racing." KRS §
230.215(2).
" No. 83-CI-1365, slip op. at 22.
I69 Id.
170 703 S.W.2d at 890.
1' Id.
,2 No. 83-CI-1365, slip. op. at 14, 22-23. The court of appeals did not reach this
issue because the court found that Fasig-Tipton's negligence in drafting the consignment
form was sufficient to impose liability. See 703 S.W.2d at 890.
" 703 S.W.2d at 887.
,"4 Id. The Jockey Club Registration Department "maintains and publishes the
American Stud Book, in which breeders can learn the blood lines of every thoroughbred
registered in the United States," which is "indispensable to the breeding and racing of
thoroughbred horses in the United States." Jockey Club v. United States, 137 F. Supp.
419, 421 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 834 (1956).
M No. 83-CI-1365, slip op. at 6. This was the definition provided by Fasig-Tipton
despite the "well recognized" inference from Keck v. Wacker, 413 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D.
Ky. 1976), that a mare once found to be in foal had slipped unless there was evidence
to the contrary. No. 83-CI-1365, slip op. at 5-6.
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mare as barren even though the veterinarian knew that the mare
had been in foal.
7 6
The form "facilitated" this error by failing to request infor-
mation on whether the mare was bred and whether a mare so
bred had not conceived or had conceived and aborted her foal.'
77
Therefore, even assuming that a seller truthfully completed the
consignment form, he may have failed to include information
material to a "breeder's decision making process."' 78 In Cher-
nick, the previous slips of Fiddler's Colleen and the slipping of
twins was material79 and would be material to any prudent
buyer.8 0 Fasig-Tipton has the ability and expertise to draft a
proper contract, and failure to fully utilize that expertise was
and is negligent. 18'
2. The Accuracy of the Seller's Representations
Fasig-Tipton was found to have "a fiduciary duty to the
purchaser and to the Commonwealth's most prestigious and
valued industry to use ordinary care to ensure that its catalog
and/or announcements were as accurate and comprehensive as
possible.' 8 2 In other words, as in Castille v. Folck,'83 the auc-
tioneer has assumed a duty to assure that all horses meet the
advertised requirements.' 84
"I No. 83-CI-1365, slip op. at 6. For example, there may be no direct evidence
(i.e., a fetus) that would show that a mare had aborted. Therefore, a mare that had
"slipped" would technically fit the definition of "barren" as provided by Fasig-Tipton
unless evidence of the slip were present. See id.
17 Id.
376 703 S.W.2d at 890. "[I]nformation that a mare 'slipped twins' is material to a
breeder's decison-making process when the horse is being considered for purchase." Id.
"' Id.
' If a mare has "slipped" or "slipped twins," it may be indicative of physical
damage to the mare, and the mare's propensity for slipping in the future increases. See
J. LOHMAN & A. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, at 84.
M 703 S.W.2d at 890.
1"2 Id. The original court of appeals' opinion found that Fasig-Tipton was a
"guarantor" for all the information in its catalog. See Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton Ky.,
Inc., 32 KLS 11, at 1 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 1985), withdrawn and reissued, 703
S.W.2d 885 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
'' 338 So. 2d at 328 (La. Ct. App. 1975).
" Id. at 332-33. This is remarkably similar to the Chernick court's holding in this
context: "In the instant situation [the] delinquency served to place Fasig-Tipton on
notice that its sales catalog was incomplete and that it was under a duty to report such
ensuing inaccuracies or to correct them." 703 S.W.2d at 890.
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The appellate division of the New York Supreme Court, in
Brodsky v. Nerud,185 applied this same rule to a claiming race.
Just as in Grandi v. LeSage, 86 discussed previously,'1 the seller
had entered a gelding in a claiming race and incorrectly listed
the horse's sex as a colt. Upon learning that the horse's sex was
incorrectly listed, the buyer brought suit for rescission and dam-
ages against the seller and the New York Racing Association
(NYRA). The NYRA argued that it was neither a party to a
contract nor a fiduciary, and therefore, "any unintentional mis-
take or misrepresentation is not actionable." ' 8
The court recognized that, although the plaintiff's complaint
was one of rescission, it was sufficient "to give the NYRA notice
that its representation (for example, in the track program) led
to the plaintiff's reliance and ultimate damage."' 8 9 Therefore,
the NYRA's failure to discover the improper listing and correct
the mistake in the racing program or by announcement "may
have constituted actionable negligence."' 9
The New York court did not decide the negligence issue. The
court, however, did recognize the cause of action. Like the
auctioneer, the racing association conducting a claiming race has
a duty to use reasonable care to assure that the representations
in its racing program are accurate. More importantly, this duty
was found to exist regardless of a fiduciary or contractual rela-
tionship. 9' Therefore, an auctioneer or a racing association by
conducting the sale could be negligent, and thus liable for dam-
ages, even though not an agent of the buyer or seller.
To assure that the catalog representations were accurate,
Fasig-Tipton relied on two sources: The Jockey Club computer
system 92 and the veterinary health certificate required to be filed
414 N.Y.S.2d 38 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
399 P.2d 285 (N.M. 1965).
' See notes 37-52 supra and accompanying text.
' 414 N.Y.S.2d at 40. This argument comports with the general rule of Castille
and Grandi that an action for contract rescission is unavailable against the seller's agent
because the agent is not a party to the contract. See 338 So. 2d at 332; 399 P.2d at
290.
414 N.Y.S.2d at 40.
'~Id.
" Neither the plaintiff nor the court disputed the NYRA's denial of the agency or
contractual relation.
192 703 S.W.2d at 890.
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with the seller's consignment form.'9 Neither of these sources
was sufficient in Chernick.
Fasig-Tipton admitted that the Jockey Club information con-
cerning Fiddler's Colleen was delinquent beyond the normal two-
year parameters. As a result, Fasig-Tipton should have been on
notice that its sales catalog was incomplete or inaccurate and
that it had a duty to report or correct any inaccuracies.' 94 Once
again, Fasig-Tipton was negligent when it failed to report or
correct the inaccuracies in its catalog.
3. The Interpretation and Enforcement of the Contract
Fasig-Tipton's final negligent act surrounded the contract
that it had drafted. In drafting its own contract, Fasig-Tipton
had given itself and its agents the authority to act and carry out
the contract's terms.'19 Fasig-Tipton's agents, however, negli-
gently applied that authority. This is most evident in their neg-
ligent enforcement of the examination provisions of the tenth
condition of sale. 196 Particularly important was Fasig-Tipton's
appointment of the "referee" veterinarian. 97 That veterinarian
found Fiddler's Colleen to be "normal."'' 98 The court considered
the previous and subsequent'" examinations and determined that
she had not been sound for breeding purposes at the fall of the
hammer. Thus, Fasig-Tipton's "referee" veterinarian was neg-
ligent when he found Fiddler's Colleen to be "normal. ' ' 200 Fasig-
1"' Id.
1w Id.
83-CI-1365, slip op. at 10.
' See note 123 supra and accompanying text. This is indistinguishable from the
circuit court's fiduciary duty approach. See notes 121-59 supra and accompanying text.
'' See note 27 supra. See also notes 129-32 supra and accompanying text.
83-CI-1365, slip op. at 12.
'p See note 27 supra.
The veterinarian orally reported that
"the mare had problems and she was inflamed inside, but that he did not
see any pus (exudate) at the time he examined her and that he felt it was
possible to get her in foal, but the only way she would be able to carry a
foal would be a deep suture.
No. 83-CI-1365, slip op. at 12. That veterinarian did not sign a certificate, as did the
previous veterinarians, but later sent a letter that recited "that he had examined Fiddler's
Colleen ... and found her to be normal on rectal and speculum examination." Id.
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Tipton was liable for his negligence 20 and for failure to properly
interpret the unambiguous terms of Fasig-Tipton's contract. "[lilt
was the duty of the Defendant, Fasig-Tipton, to void the sale
and declare the mare to be the property of the seller."2 2
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR AvoING, LLBILITy
A close analysis of Chernick is a valuable tool for the seller
and auctioneer wishing to avoid liability. By comparing Chernick
with similar cases, it is possible to devise a framework for
avoiding liability. Of course, some problems, such as evil intent,
can be corrected only by changing an individual's behavior. But
a change in the drafting and enforcement of sale terms may
prevent liability absent any actual intent to deceive.
A. The Consignment Form
The Kentucky Court of Appeals clearly stated how to avoid
liability resulting from a faulty consignment form. Specifically,
the court noted, "Fasig-Tipton has at its disposal the expertise
necessary to ascertain such information and to formulate a ques-
tionaire the responses to which would convey a mare's complete
produce record. By so doing Fasig-Tipton would comply with
both its contractual and professional duty to fully disclose all
material facts. "203 Therefore, the form used must "convey a
mare's complete produce record. ' '204 In 1984, due to the cases
discussed previously, most sales companies added "slipped" to
their consignment forms and catalogs. 20 5 In addition, sales com-
panies have changed their bid boards to include a sign reading
''not in foal" in addition to the regular "in foal" and "barren"
signs.2
06
201 Id. This conforms to the general rule that a principal is liable for the negligent
acts of his agent. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 265 (1958).
202 No. 83-CI-1365, slip op. at 14-16.
Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton Ky., Inc., 703 S.W.2d 885, 90 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
-"Id.
" See J. LOHMAN & A. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, at 84. Prior to 1984, the
mares were being offered as " 'In Foal,' which means the mare ... is believed to be in
foal ... ;" Id. "Barren," which means that the mare is believed to be sound for breeding
but failed to conceive when bred; and "Not Bred," which means that the mare is sound
for breeding but, for whatever reason, was not bred. Id.
- Id.; Hollingsworth, supra note 4, at 5147.
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This is a step in the right direction, but there remain some
loopholes through which a misrepresentation could pass. For
example, a mare might be listed as "slipped" when, in fact, the
mare had "slipped twins." Whether a mare had aborted one
fetus or twins is a material fact and, if misstated, could lead to
a cause of action for breach of warranty or fraud.2 7 The auction
company must make sure that the consignment form reveals all
facts surrounding a slip or other physical defect. This would
best be accomplished by requiring that the seller reveal all per-
tinent facts in textual form. Among these facts should be recent
breeding efforts and results.
Finally, in representing the horse's condition, the auction
companies cannot rely on outdated statistical information. Auc-
tion companies have an affirmative duty, at least in Kentucky,
to use reasonable care to assure that all pertinent facts are
accurate and to report or correct any inaccuracies. This requires
a request that the seller or consignor provide breeding status
information for all prior years, not just the last two. Auction
companies should then compare this to all available data, to
assure that they have fully used their expertise. The auction
company must also make all the natural inferences that would
result from this knowledge.
20
To correct the data, auction companies should either note
the change in the catalog or in the auctioneer's announcement,
because the announcement takes precedence over the catalog. 2°9
Announcing corrections and videotaping the sale will provide
back-up proof as to the exact representation ultimately made to
the buyer.
210
703 S.W.2d at 890.
For example, delinquent or missing data should put the auctioneer "on notice"
that a problem may exist. Id. Furthermore, if the examination ten days before the sale
shows that the horse is barren when the horse had been previously found to be in foal,
then the auctioneer should realize that the mare has slipped. Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton
Ky., Inc., No. 83-CI-1365, slip op. at 5-6 (Fayette Cir. Ct. Apr. 5, 1984).
'- See J. LOHMAN & A. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, at 84. See also note 22 supra.
-"o Two authors give the following advice to the novice horse trader:
If the catalogue says the mare is in foal, and you don't listen to the
announcements which say she's barren or has slipped, you're responsible
for the price you paid, thinking she was in foal. The sales are videotaped,
today, and the sales company will play the videotape of the announcement
back to you, and say, "sorry about that."
J. LOHMAN & A. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, at 84.
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B. Fulfilling Obligations in Conducting the Sale
In all cases involving thoroughbred auctioneers, the auc-
tioneer's first line of defense is always that he is merely a stake-
holder for the parties to the sale.2 1' This'defense, however, has
gained little recognition.212 Once an auction company dictates
the sale terms, U.C.C. section 1-102213 obligates it to impartially
carry out the terms.21 4 These terms necessarily address some of
the "practicalities and peculiarities of the thoroughbred horse
auction business. ' 2 1 5 Therefore, auction companies should prop-
erly carry out the contract's terms rather than omit them from
the agreement.
Strictly enforcing the agreement will best serve the goal of
proper sale conduct. If the agreement calls for three veterinary
examinations, then pre-sale examinations should be counted.
Alternatively, the condition may be rewritten to include only
those veterinary exams occurring after the sale. Such a condition
should be acceptable to both the industry and the courts because
211 See, e.g., Chernick v. Fasig Tipon Ky., Inc., 703 S.W.2d at 889; Castille v.
Folck, 338 So. 2d 328, 330 (La. Ct. App. 1976). The New York Racing Association
made a similar assertion when it argued that it was not a party to any contract in
Brodsky v. Nerud, 414 N.Y.S.2d 38, 41 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1979).
2 The principle reason for the rejection of this argument has been the auctioneer's
undertaking to dictate the sale terms and guaranty the accuracy of catalog information.
703 S.W.2d at 890; 338 So. 2d at 333. See also notes 156-58 supra and accompanying
text.
213 U.C.C. § 1-102 provides in pertinent part:
(3) The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement,
except as otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obligations of
good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may
not be disclaimed by agreement but the parties may by agreement determine
the standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be
measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
U.C.C. § 1-102 (1972) (emphasis added). The tenth condition of Fasig-Tipton's sale
clearly falls within this provision. See note 123 supra and accompanying text. The
emphasized portion of U.C.C. § 1-102 supports the general rule that a party may not
contractually disclaim its own negligence under the U.C.C. No. 83-CI-1365, slip op. at
21. This rule must be distinguished from the rule outside the U.C.C. in which one may
disclaim his own negligence by express agreement. See PROSSER & KEETON, TJsa LAw OF
ToRTs 482-84 (5th ed. 1984).
23 See notes 122-36 supra and accompanying text.
2.1 No. 83-CI-1365, slip op. at 21.
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the critical time for evaluating the horse's soundness is imme-
diately after the fall of the hammer.
21 6
Proper interpretation of the sales contract does not end the
auction company's duty. The auction company may still be liable
if the examinations are conducted improperly. For example, the
Fayette Circuit Court held Fasig-Tipton liable for the negligence
of the veterinarian that they chose. 217 Thus, it is important to
retain a qualified, experienced veterinarian who will give an
impartial opinion about the horse's soundness. A veterinarian
chosen based on his past record of examinations favorable to
the auctioneer may subject even an otherwise prudent auctioneer
to liability.
All of these requirements point to two words that sum up
the auctioneer's duty: fairness and impartiality. Regardless of
whether the auctioneer is an agent of the buyer and the seller,
his position as a final ajudicator 218 and holder of the public
trust 219 requires that he complete the sale with a view to more
than merely recovering his commission.
CONCLUSION
The end result of Chernick was correct. The sellers were or
should have been aware that they were misr~epresenting the breed-
ing history of Fiddler's Colleen. The auctioneer, although not a
party to the sale contract, helped promote the fraud through the
auctioneer's negligence and should likewise be liable. The Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals' use of dictum in this case is question-
216 The Fayette Circuit Court implied that excluding those exams prior to the sale
would be the better approach.
While it may be more logical to exclude the seller's veterinarian's certificate
rendered within ten (10) days before sale this is not what is provided in
the tenth condition. Perhaps that is what it ought to provide since it is the
condition of a mare at the fall of the hammer which is the issue and not
her condition either before or after the fall of the hammer. Obviously an
examination within twenty-four (24) hours after the fall of the hammer
would be best calculated to determine her condition at the time of sale.
No. 83-CI-1365, slip op. at 14.
2"7 See note 201 supra and accompanying text.
21m See J. LOHMAN & A. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, at 85.
219 See 703 S.W.2d at 890. "Fasig-Tipton had a fiduciary duty to the purchaser,
and to the Commonwealth's most prestigious and valued industry." Id.
1985-86]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
able. Regardless of whether the use of dictum was proper,
Kentucky courts have shown their propensity for making such a
decision, and their decision should send a warning to the seller
and consignor to beware.
The common theme pervading the circuit and appellate court
decisions is the importance of the thoroughbred industry to
Kentucky. That fact not only imposes a public responsibility on
thoroughbred consignment companies, but also justifies punitive
damages awards by imposing a duty on the seller separate from
his contractual duty to the buyer.
Consignment companies have been charged with the duty of
upholding the integrity of Kentucky's thoroughbred sales indus-
try. This blanket statement, however, may be too extreme, for
it is clear that although "[a]uction sales are of public con-
cern, "220 auctioneer's are not "public officer[s],'"'22 and any
attempt to raise them to such a level should arguably be a
legislative function. In any event, the consignor, as the seller's
agent, may be liable for fraudulent misrepresentation unless he
takes affirmative steps assuring full use of professional resources
to determine whether any discrepancies exist in the catalog de-
scriptions. 21 The question then becomes whether the auctioneer's
actions as the seller's agent, impose liability on an innocent
seller.223
220 Robenson v. Yann, 5 S.W.2d 271, 274 (Ky. 1928).
I" Sumuller v. Fuchs, I A. 120, 122 (Md. 1885). That case went on to note that
an auctioneer's business "is essentially a private one. He may sell or not, as he pleases,
and is not in any respect under the slightest obligations to the public." Id.
22 An agent failing to correct such misrepresentations may be liable to the same
extent as if he had made the misrepresentations or "knowingly assist[ed] in the com-
mission of tortious fraud or duress." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 348 (1958).
Comment c offers the following hypothetical:
[l]f an agent who has been given misinformation by a principal, on the
strength of which he makes statements to a third person, later discovers
the untruth and refrains from taking steps to inform the other party, the
agent is subject to liability if subsequently the other party completes the
transaction with the principal or another agent, relying in part upon the
statements of the first agent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 348, Comment c (1958).
21 Address by Robert Miller at the Continuing Legal Education Seminar on equine
law (May 2, 1986) (outline of remarks available in University of Kentucky Continuing
Legal Education office).
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The effect of Chernick in other jurisdictions will depend on
the emphasis that the jurisdiction places on the thoroughbred
industry. In those states in which the promotion of the thor-
oughbred is embodied in statutes (as in Kentucky),2 4 the courts
likely will follow the Chernick court's reasoning. In states in
which the commitment to the industry is not statutorily pre-
scribed, Chernick's impact is less clear. Nevertheless, even the
dicta in Chernick should influence any court considering a sim-
ilar issue.
Paul L. Reynolds
n, Aside from the Kentucky statutory approach of general promotion of the thor-
oughbred industry, some states regulate the public sale of thoroughbred horses. For
example, Florida requires special licensing of thoroughbred "sales organizations." FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 535.01 (West Cum. Supp. 1986). Similarly, California law provides for
revocation of an auctioneer's license where the auctioneer misrepresents the nature of
the items to be sold. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5776(p) (West Cum. Supp. 1986).
Statutes of this nature may become important when an auctioneer misstates the
results of a sale or allows agents to buy back their horses. See Hollingsworth, supra
note 4, at 5146. See also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5776(o) (Cum. Supp. 1986).
Public policy interests, however, will not be sufficient merely because the "state
regulates the business." Rutter v. Arlington Park Jockey Club, 510 F.2d 1065, 1069 (7th
Cir. 1975). In Rutter, the court would not invalidate on public policy grounds an
exculpatory clause that disclaimed negligent performance of a contractual obligation. Id.
at 1069. When a jurisdiction takes such a view, it may be possible for the auction
company to disclaim its negligence.
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